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1 The Issue
There is a huge amount of concern in the policy arena surrounding the re-
liability of pensions whether provided in the public or private sectors. It
seems fair to say that, until recently, the problems of credibility were mostly
associated with public pensions. Throughout the 1990s, it became clear that
many public pension programs had o¤ered pensions that were not sustainable
in nancial terms at current tax levels.1 This lead to degree of smugness in
those parts of the world, such as the Netherlands, U.K., and U.S., that had
encouraged private alternatives to public pensions.
But since the turn of the millennium, the credibility problem has spread
to the private pensions industry. A series of high prole problems in private
pensions such as Allied and Wireless and corporate scandals such as Enron
and Parmalat have dented condence in the governance of private money.
Many apparently cast iron pension guarantees suddenly looked vulnerable in
the wake of declining stock markets. In the UK, estimates of the aggregate
private pension decit vary from 160 to 300 billion pounds (CBI 2003).
The visibility of this has issue has attracted attention from policy makers.
A recent report by the House of Commons Treasury Committee on "Restoring
Condence in Long-term Savings" concluded that:
"It is widely accepted that a lack of consumer condence in
parts of the nancial services industry is now deterring many
This paper is based on a presentation to the British Association, Festival of Science
held at the University of Exeter in September 2004.
1See, for example, OECD (2003).
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households from saving as much as they might otherwise choose
to."
and that
"There is no scope for complacency when it comes to public
trust in the solidity and solvency of savings institutions."
This paper is about the problem of trust in public and private pensions.
Trust is largely a problem of credibility and whether we can reasonably be-
lieve that pension providers (public or private) will provide a reliable context
for long-term pensions planning? To understand this issue requires an analy-
sis of governance arrangements the framework in which pensions decisions
are made.
Behind the problems of credibility lie two key facts about pensions arrange-
ments. First, pensions arrangements are not spot markettransactions 
they rely on fulllment of obligations over signicant periods of time. That
need not, by itself, create any substantial issues. For example, the same
is true in many other contracts for example long-term leases and drilling
contracts for oil. This is where the second key feature comes in. Pensions
arrangements have been governed by highly incomplete contractual arrange-
ments. In fact pensions (almost everywhere we see them) are promises rather
than contractual obligations. This greatly limits recourse to legal remedy
in enforcing pensions rights. There may be possibilities to tighten the form
of contracts in future. But there are very real di¢ culties in specifying ex-
actly what obligations are required. It is for this reason that governance is
important and will remain a key issue.
There are three distinct sources of risk in saving for retirement. The
rst concern problems of non-performance of pensions due to events that
are outside the control of individuals. This includes exposure to some risks
in nancial markets. In principle, these risks could be mitigated by hav-
ing individuals save for old-age in some form of private low-risk savings.
However, returns can be expanded by exploiting standard risk-return trade-
o¤s. There are also some opportunities to mitigate risks by some form of
risk pooling arrangement, which require a richer contractual structure and
greater reliance on the performance of other parties.
However, the involvement of other parties creates the second source of
risk: agency problems. Unless suitable arrangements can be found to prevent
opportunism in such contexts, individuals may considerable risk.
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A third source of risk arises in so far as individuals have failings in judg-
ing their own self-interest. This could be because individuals are poorly
informed or else because of some defective decision making capacity short-
sightenedness or problems of time-inconsistency.2
In all these cases, there is a premium on nding arrangements that miti-
gate risks and allow individuals to make high quality investment and savings
decisions. Governance arrangements are a key part of this.3
Debates about pensions policies and pensions arrangements have paid re-
markably little attention to governance issues. Policy discussions seem to
be premised on a model of government as a benign (although occasionally
misguided) social planner. Most of the focus has thence been on techno-
cratic issues for example developing transparent and accurate projections
or improved accounting. Comparatively less attention has been paid to
understand government incentives to produce high quality public pensions.
This lack of attention to governance issues is even more striking in the
context of private pensions. Incentive problems have received very little
attention. This may be due to the fact that the maturity of many private
pensions was reached during the bull run of the 1990s.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we will develop a
simple approach to thinking about governance and apply it to public and
private pensions. Second we discuss how institutions can be designed to
deal with these issues in the hope of increasing the problems associated with
governance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we lay a structure for thinking about governance and apply it to both pub-
lic and private pensions. Section four then applies these ideas to ways of
improving credibility.
2 Institution Design
The key issue that concerns us here is whether it is possible to design institu-
tional solutions which safe-guard pension arrangements while still providing
an attractive return to individuals. These are arrangements that solve the
problems that arise via the variety of risks to which retirement saving is
subject.
2The literature in this area is now vast. See Rabin (2002) for a recent overview.
3See OECD (2000) for general discussion.
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Experience suggests that adequate solutions are unlikely to rely exclu-
sively on either public or private arrangements. It is necessary to understand
public decision making (political economy) and private decision making in
markets to strike the right balance.
2.1 Framework
In this section, we discuss a simple structure for thinking about governance
in pension plans in general. We then apply these ideas to di¤erent kinds of
pension contracts. Pension arrangements have three key players: sponsors,
beneciaries and asset managers. These actors are responsible for making
the key decisions that contribute towards a successful pension scheme.
The governance architecture of a pension arrangement is dened in terms
of key control rights, i.e. the authority to make certain important decisions.
We identify three main aspects of control rights: (i) contributions how
much to contribute to a pension plan and out of whose pocket; (ii) vigilance
taking responsibility for making sure that the plan is prudently managed
(for example matching assets and liabilities); (iii) asset management mak-
ing portfolio choices. As we will show below, di¤erent types of pension
arrangements nd ways to allocate control rights. While the detail matters
for example the relationships between pension sponsors and trustees can
be quite complex, as a rst pass this is a useful framework.
A nal important idea is the issue of residual claimancy who owns resid-
ual assets. This will shape the incentives that actors have for making certain
decisions. We now show how public and private pension arrangements can
be described in these terms
2.2 Government Pension plans
In the case of government pensions, the government plays the role of sponsor
and asset manager. The beneciary in this case are the citizens of the country
who are eligible for benets in the public pension plan. Their contributions
are typically in the form of taxes although they could include some kinds of
additional voluntary contributions.
Control rights in public pension plans are geared heavily towards the
government. In general, they set contributions rates through the tax system
and they decide how to manage assets and liabilities and responsibility for
guaranteeing that any benets that are promised are provided for adequately.
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The rights of beneciaries are conned to periodic elections over multiple
issues, i.e., where pension policy is one of many things that are o¤ered as
part of political platforms.
Typically, state pension plans, including those in the UK, US, and the
largest EU countries, are nanced on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. This
means that current pension benets are paid out of current contributions
or taxes rather than accumulated assets. As a result, asset management
function is rather di¤erent in funded pensions schemes, the main activity
being cash-ow control to ensure that there is su¢ cient income to cover
current outlays.4
Most government pension plans are compulsory and monopolistic, i.e.
there is little scope to choose between competing pension arrangements.
These features could be rationalized on the grounds of adverse selection prob-
lems in annuity markets. However, the roots of public pensions are better
located in two things. First, the paternalism concern that individuals left
to save for themselves will do inadequately. Second, the need to nd some
way of nancing an adequate retirement income for those have earned low
incomes during their working lives.
As far as governance is concerned, pensions use the general political
process. The solvency of pension arrangements is backed by taxable capac-
ity. As we have seen in the U.K. it has been extremely easy for governments
to repeatedly make policy changes that have an impact on the quality of
public (and private) pensions. While governments may wish to phase these
in over long-time horizons, they have no obligation to do so. The ultimate
sanction that voters have is to remove the government at the polls. This
kind of governance mechanism cannot guarantee long-run predictability the
political process is sovereign and hence could, in principle, decided to change
the system at any future date.
The traditional view of political competition sees the median voter as
gaining attention from politicians. But this is not particularly useful in
thinking about pensions policy. For example, this model is di¢ cult to apply
4This explains why the management of PAYG pensions usually not outsourced. See
however Valdés-Prieto (2004) for an innovative proposal to securitize the stream of future
pension contributions, thus creating a PAYG pension asset, which could then be treated
as the asset of a fully funded scheme. Asset management could then be delegated to
external agents and tailored to the needs of individual beneciaries. However, as the
author acknowledges, securitization can only occur once the government has overcome the
issue of credibility.
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to the analysis of pensions since there are multiple cleavages in the pen-
sions sphere young versus old, rich versus poor etc. The strongest kind
of evidence against a simplistic view of the political determination process
is provided by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004b). After analyzing the fea-
tures of public pension programs in a cross-section of country, they conclude
that similar programs emerge and grow under very di¤erent political sys-
tems. In particular, there is no discernible di¤erence between dictatorships
and democracies. We thus need to turn to more subtle political theories.5
In theory, the political process will pay most attention to pensioners in-
terests to the extent to which pensioners are swing voters  i.e. inclined
to change their party loyalty in response to pensions policies. This in turn
depends on how salient is the pensions issue compared to other cleavages
among the parties. For example, if parties have similar policies on other
issues, we might expect pensioners to vote on the basis of pensions policy.
Otherwise, it depends on how they weigh up pensions policy against other
policy and reputational di¤erences that separate the parties. The numerical
size of the pensioner group matters only when pensions are salient in this
group. While the pensioner population is growing, it is less obvious that
pensioners are becoming an important class of swing voters.
When thinking through governance in the political process, it is useful
therefore to think through two extreme cases. The rst is where pensioners
have little political power. Pensions policy is then determined mainly by the
actions of bureaucrats, party elites and interest groups. While this maybe
relatively undemocratic, this could actually be conducive to policy stability
to the extent that there is a long-run consensus among the relevant parties.
The second case is where pensions is highly salient and pensioners are weakly
attached to parties. This will tend to make pensions policy more sensitive
to electoral politics. If parties adopt divergent policies, then a greater role
for politics could actually increase policy uncertainty. Moreover, pensions
policy will tend to react to current short term interest of he currently retired.
The U.K. has traditionally been in the rst of these two scenarios where
the role of electoral politics has played little role in determining pensions
policy. But this has not been a source of stability as there have been shifting
views on the kind of pensions policy that is deemed desirable in the public
sector. The U.K. began with a consensus on implementing a basic state
5For an extensive discussion of the political economy of pensions, see Persson and
Tabellini (2000, Section 6.2).
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pension that would provide a reasonable living standard to all retirees, but
this has shifted increasingly towards state pension provision that are seen
as a poverty alleviation device.6 This political shift began in the Thatcher
years when pensionsincreases were decoupled from earnings. There is now
evidence that pensions are becoming a more attractive group of swing voters
principally because the relative decline in state pensions has increased the
demand among the currently retired for pensions increases. Almost weekly,
parties now compete by o¤ering their own reform proposals creating greater
policy uncertainty. By creating greater political uncertainty, this is likely to
reduce rather than increase trust in state pensions.
Once we accept that public pension systems are the equilibrium of a
complex dynamic political problem that includes the possibility of ex post
renegotiation, we must ask what determines the credibility of such a system.
Boeri, Börsch-Supan, and Tabellini (2000) analyze a survey of citizensopin-
ions in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The rst thing to note (Table
1) is that in every country, except Spain, a vast majority of citizen expects
a serious pension crisis in the next 10/15 years. The response does not ap-
pear to be linked to demographic dynamics: the most pessimistic country,
France, also enjoys one of the highest fertility rates in Europe, while the most
optimistic, Spain, has one of the lowest.
Table 1 Some people speak of a possible crisis in public pension systems, which
would mean that, in ten/fteen years time we would not be able to enjoy
public pensions at their actual level? Do you agree with this opinion?
France Germany Italy Spain
Dont know/no answer 14% 6% 7% 23%
Of those who answered: Yes 82% 81% 72% 43%
Source: Boeri, Börsch-Supan, and Tabellini
6In fact the state pension has now reached the point that additional targeted transfers
are needed to deal with pensioner poverty.
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When asked whether they would like to opt out of the public system al-
together, the answer depends on the alternative. If opting out means getting
cash and a reduced pension benet in the future, the majority is opposed
(Table 2). If, however, the alternative consists of diverting the contributions
that are currently going into the state system into an investment fund of their
choice, the vast majority of citizens are in favor, except in France, where they
are equally split (Table 3).
Table 2 Suppose that you were o¤ered the following less contribution - less pen-
siondeal. Namely, you were o¤ered to reduce your contributions to<national
public pension system> by one half (e.g., rather than paying 30 per cent,
you pay 15 per cent <adjusted by country>), and receive this amount in
your pay slip. When you retire, you will get a lower pension as if you had
worked at 50 per cent of your salary from tomorrow onwards. Would you
accept such a deal?
France Germany Italy Spain
Dont know/no answer 6.5% 4.3% 6.6% 7.5%
Of those who answered: Yes 24.4% 47.2% 46.9% 18.9%
Table 3 Consider a slightly di¤erent proposal: The compulsory contributions rather
than being put in your pay slip would be put in an investment fund of your
choice. You would be free to cash in from that fund only upon retirement.
Would you accept such a deal?
France Germany Italy Spain
Dont know/no answer 11.8% 4.3% 9.7% 13.2%
Of those who answered: Yes 49.7% 71% 67% 63%
Source: Boeri, Börsch-Supan, and Tabellini
8
Boeri et al. obtain further insight by examining the characteristics of the
individuals who wish to switch to a private system. The most likely to want to
switch are the young, the males, the educated, and the informed (the level of
information was obtained in previous survey questions). Surprisingly, income
is only marginally signicant. Another interesting fact is that a majority of
the respondents who would accept an unconditional opt-out that would save
all the additional income for old age provision.
While the picture that emerges from the survey is still blurred, there are
already some clear patterns:
 The credibility of the classical European PAYG system is low. People
expect a crisis in the not so distant future. Mistrust is high even in a
country like Italy which saw radical pension reform in the past decade.
 Most people want to opt out of state pensions. They wish to leave the
state pension system, not to enjoy the additional income now, but to
invest in alternative savings schemes that they presumably deem more
reliable.
 Information plays an important role. Mistrust in the public system is
higher in those individuals who know it better. As information about
pensions improves, we should expect an even greater wish to move to
private provision.
It is di¢ cult not to conclude that the European PAYG model is a failure,
at least from the point of view of credibility. At the root of the problem
lie the excessively generous promises that were made in past decades. In
the 60s and 70s governments guaranteed large pension entitlements to the
then working age generations at the expense of the future ones (who were
under-represented in the voting process). This is a warning signal to any
country, like the U.K., that is considering expanding the role of the state in
pension provision. The experience in Continental Europe teaches us that it
is di¢ cult to have PAYG provision that is both generous and credible.
2.3 Private Pension Plans
We now turn to private pension plans and how they try to solve the prob-
lems of credibility. The issues that arise are di¤erent depending on whether
the plan is dened benet or dene contribution and we discuss each in
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turn. Before entering into detailed discussion, it merits observing that pri-
vate pensions arrangements are also subject to signicant public governance
risk. First, the whole macro-economic and nancial climate is dependent on
good nancial management by government. Second, a raft of government
policies a¤ect the operation of private pensions. These include, in particular
the structure of tax reliefs which created the pensions industry as distinct
savings vehicle. The performance of private pensions is intertwined with
these policies.
2.3.1 Dened Benet Plans
In a dened benet plan, the employer is the sponsor, being responsible in
the rst instance for collecting contributions from employees and safeguard-
ing these. Asset management and vigilance is more complicated and varies a
great deal. However, most plans work on the basis of appointed trustees who
retain a duciary duty to the beneciaries. These trustees retain responsi-
bility for assessing the adequacy of assets against liabilities and frequently
employ consulting actuaries to assist in this task. Large funds typically
use some system of delegated asset management. The beneciaries then
negotiate with the sponsor over contributions to the fund. The degree of
separation between the management of the pension fund and the corporate
sponsor varies somewhat, particular in the extent to which the trustees are
also active in the sponsors business.
To illustrate, consider the case of Hermes which is the pensions plan for
British Telecom (BT) in the U.K.. Hermes is governed by the BT Pension
Scheme Board of Trustees, which comprises four member representatives,
four company representatives; two from BT and two nominated by BT, and
a Chairman, whose appointment is agreed by all the Trustees. The Board
delegates management responsibility of Hermes to its Chief Executive, Chief
Investment O¢ cer, Chief Operating O¢ cer and Head of Business Develop-
ment.7
One overriding feature of DB plans is that the sponsor is a residual
claimant. This can entitle a sponsor to take a contributions holiday or
even wind up an over funded pension scheme. While this was historically
thought of as a problem of distributing surpluses, in recent years the key
issue is how the sponsor becomes liable for pension fund decits.
7See www.hermes.com for more details.
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It is apparent from this description, that the governance of DB plans is via
a nexus of complex agency problems. By placing the notion of duciary duty
at the heart of governance, the hope is that the interests of beneciaries will
gure centrally in all aspects of funding, asset management and vigilance.
But equally this rests on trustees exercising their duty of care and their
duty of loyalty in a satisfactory manner. This is not an issue of incentives
in any straightforward sense. Trustees are not rewarded based on their
performance and for the system to work, they have either to care strongly
about their reputations (implicit incentives) or else work altruistically on
behalf of beneciaries.
The duciary model also raises issues of competence. There has been a
great deal of recent attention on whether trustees have su¢ cient expertise 
for example to scrutinize actuarial projections.8
The main governance problems that have arisen in DB plans are as fol-
lows. First, there are problems of under-funding. Given that sponsors have
only loose legal obligations, it has been feasible for plans to become under-
funded and hence to walk away from their pension obligations. Second,
there are related problems of risk management. Sponsors may have poor
incentives to manage risk optimally on behalf of employees if they have too
much say in governance. For example, plans that are approaching insolvency
encourage risk taking as form of gambling for resurrection.
However, at the core of the DB plan is an attractive risk sharing benet
the ability to smooth risk across successive generations of employees and
to mitigate adverse selection in annuity markets. However, on the down-
side, such plans are unattractive to mobile labour. Moreover, there are few
possibilities to introduce competition between pension plans since jobs and
pensions are bundled in the market place.
The DB model was the dominant form of pensions arrangement for two
generations. Such plans survived in part since governance problems were
comparatively rare. It is now clear that there have been signicant gov-
ernance issues which were masked largely by high asset returns. But the
picture is far from universally bleak there are many examples of successful
schemes. That said, it is clear that employees should not take the security of
DB plans for granted and given the di¢ culty of organizing collective action
in the work place and the decline of trades unions, there is a governance
decit which requires serious thought.
8See Myners (2001) and Robinson and Kakabadse (2002) for discussion.
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The data show that dened benet plans are now on the wane in the
U.K. which is now following a trend established in the U.S. some years ago.
Many schemes are closed to new members. As workers retire, the relative
importance of DB keeps decreasing. Until the beginning of the Eighties, in
the US DB schemes accounted for over half of the amount contributed to
private pension schemes. By 1999, they accounted for less than 20% and the
trend is still negative. There is some indication that the UK has taken the
same route. Unless there is a surprising reversal, in a couple of decades DB
schemes will play a negligible role for active private sector workers (but not
for retirees).
A combination of factors has brought about the demise of the DB plan,
such as the increase in labor mobility and the appearance of user-friendly
nancial products. From our viewpoint, the key consideration is the lack of
credibility of DB arrangements, at least in the UK. The systematic under-
funding of the Nineties and the wind-ups of the past years have created a
general awareness that dened benets are not as denedas workers used
to think. To make light of the situation, the government imposed a more
transparent market-based standard (FRS17) which led to a more precise,
and unfortunately more worrying, picture of the funding gap. Companies
realize that restoring credibility would entail large contributions to pension
funds and they are reluctant to do it. For instance, the estimated funding
gap of British Airways is roughly equal to half its market capitalization.
With hindsight, the DB crisis could have been avoided by imposing stricter
accounting standards on DB schemes from the beginning and by making the
DB pension promises binding. Companies would have then be encouraged
to ensure proper funding, perhaps at the cost of lower promises or higher
contributions.
The government is now trying to restore credibility by providing partial
insurance of DB schemes through the Pension Protection Fund (modelled
after the US Pensions Benet Guaranty Corporation). This begs the question
of whether the PPF is itself credible. What happens if a su¢ cient number of
DB schemes fail (for instance because of a severe drop in stock prices) and
the PPF becomes insolvent?
The government portrays the PPF as a self-nancing insurance scheme
and is adamant in o¤ering no guarantee that it would bail out the Fund in
case of default. If we take the governments denial at face value, this means
that the credibility of the PPF as a whole derives from the sustainability of
the bulk of the DB plans, which, as we have seen above, is highly question-
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able. Moreover, the introduction of insurance will worsen the moral hazard
problem on the part of sponsors: the temptation of trying to devise ways to
shed their pension promises will be even higher than it is now.
If instead we believe that ex post the government will consider bailing
out an insolvent PPF, then we should apply a political economy model but
trying to predict today whether and how the government would intervene is
at this stage a guessing game. It will depend on the economic and political
climate at the moment when the default happens.
The PPF is unlikely to reach its stated goal of reducing the level of
uncertainty surrounding DB schemes. Whether one believes in the no-bail-
out promise or not, the introduction of the fund o¤ers no clean solution to the
DB credibility issue. It dodges the issue of how to reduce the huge aggregate
gap between assets and liabilities and it adds new potential sources of agency
problems.
2.3.2 Dened Contribution Plans
The other form of private pension arrangement is that organized by dened
contribution (DC). In the limiting case, the individual is the beneciary,
sponsor and asset manager. But in reality there is some delegation. First,
employers are sponsors in several respects. First, they plan some role in se-
lecting a preferredprovider which may also resulting in favorable manage-
ment terms. Second, by making direct contributions (often with a matching
element) employers promote workplace savings. Third, employers may also
play a role in monitoring the on-going quality of the plan especially when
it is a preferred provider. That said, it is clear that such plans really much
less on solving agency problems than do DB plans.
In a broad sense, the agency problem at the heart of DC plans concerns
the individual concerned. In making asset management, contributions and
vigilance decisions, the beneciary has to act in the best interest of his/her
future self. The recent literature in behavioral economics has attached a
lot of weight to personal agency problems which could lead to poor decision
making on any or all of these dimensions. It is not easy to be motivated
to read the detailed reports when there are other distractions. There is
pervasive evidence to boot that consumers are very poorly informed about
pensions issues. Indeed, it is ine¢ cient to have everyone in the economy
well-informed about the pensions market delegation to a benevolent expert
would clearly be better.
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Thus, DC plans replace external with internal agency problems. This
exposes beneciaries to a di¤erent kind of governance risk. This is on top
of the fact that DC plans o¤er little direct means to ensure against market
uctuations that with inexible retirement dates can expose individuals
to currently undiversiable risk. They also create adverse selection issues in
annuities markets (see Finklestein and Poterba (2004))
On the up-side competition can play a more important role in the market
for DC plans since it is relatively easy for individuals to switch between
providers. In principle, this should lead plans to invest more in pleasing
their customers and allow individuals to diversify their risk across plans.
DC plans have been extremely successful in the US: 401(k) plans, which
were started in 1980, are now the most common form of private pension pro-
vision in the US. Their success is probably due to their simplicity. These are
individual plans that workers can take with them if they change jobs. Typ-
ically, workers can choose among several classes of investments and several
providers within the same class. There is evidence that the introduction of
401(k) plans has led to the accumulation of large levels of private pension
assets (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2001).
In the UK too, DC is fast becoming the dominant form of pension arrange-
ment. Evidence from the pensions commission showed, however, that the
typical level of contributions going into to DC plans is lower than contri-
butions to comparable DB plans of a few years ago. This is suggestive
(although far form denitive evidence) that personal agency problems may
be important. But simplifying agency relationships (even if they are not
entirely eliminated) is an arguable advantage of the switch from DB to DC
especially if attention is paid to creating nancial instruments that limit the
resulting risk exposure.
3 Enhancing Credibility
We now explore how specic initiatives may be possible to enhance the cred-
ibility of pensions in either public or private sectors.
We begin with policy credibility. We have argued that governance based
on periodic elections cannot easily deliver the kind of long-term commitment
that underpins credibility. Whether delegating policy analysis and recom-
mendations to independent bodies such as The Pensions Commission in the
U.K. enhances policy credibility is moot. There is clear value in the clarity of
14
thinking that can survive more easily outside the political process. However,
it is also clear that the political process is ultimately needed to comply in
nding solutions. Moreover, agging issues without proposing solutions as
has been done in the preliminary report (The Pensions Commission (2004))
seems to have created a climate of even greater policy uncertainty. The
decision by the current U.K. government to postpone policy proposals until
after the next election has only exacerbated this problem. Past policies in
the U.K. have ensured that pensions are more fertile political territory for
policy pronouncements. Hence, a return pension policy largely overseen by
technocrats is not an option. Thus, to enhance policy credibility requires
instead an element of political consensus on key aspects of pensions policy
now and in the future. Moreover such a consensus would be most valuable
when an election is looming.
Public pensions credibility could be enhanced by delegating policy deci-
sions rather than only analysis and recommendations. This is the thinking
behind the move to create independent authorities such as the Bank of Eng-
land. But this model has clear limitations and is not feasible in the context
of pensions. First, contributions to pensions are essentially taxes and del-
egating tax authority in this way raises di¢ cult issues of reconciliation of
these commitments with others that are nanced through taxation.
However, even if direct policy delegation is unlikely, there is scope to
create a cross-party standing body as the guardian of consensus on pensions
issues. Such as body could draw a list of principles for pensions policy to
which all major political groups consent and will agree to abide by over the
next twenty years. While full commitment is not possible, the symbolic force
of such a compact could play a role in convincing those making long range
planning that there is an important element of political consensus.
In the context of the private sector, there are three main issues. First,
the process of tightening up on governance in DB plans, dening the role
and responsibility of trustees is important. In the sphere of corporate gover-
nance, the Cadbury and Higgs reports have resulted in codes of good practice
which are now adopted on a comply or explainbasis. Similar codes are
needed in the sphere of pension fund governance with the same common law
status.9 While the OECD has played a leading role in developing principles
for governance, the thrust of many of these is to suggest regulations rather
than relying on systems of self-regulation through voluntary adoption of good
9See, for example, the proposals in OECD (2002).
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practice.10
The second raft of measures need to be aimed at dealing with personal
agency problems. There are two routes. First, we could create better con-
sumersthrough education programs. There is some evidence from the U.S.
that these programs have an impact (see, for example, Bernheim and Garrett
(2003)). Second, greater thought is needed about the role of collectives in
DC provision. It is socially ine¢ cient to have every citizen be an expert
in vigilance and asset management. Society needs workable arrangements
that provide this good collectively. It is not clear that delegation of this to
government is the answer here either. It is arguable that employers have a
comparative advantage. To be e¤ective pensions intermediaries need to be
credible i.e., independent and farsighted. This is a challenging problem of
institution design that gets little attention. But without it, seems hard to
see how the problem of pensions credibility can be resolved.
4 Concluding Comments
The issues that we have discussed here are central to designing an adequate
pensions system. Recent experience has revealed severe problems with public
and private management of pensions arrangements.
At the risk of excessive simplication, there are broadly four types of
system that can be envisaged: (i) Bismarckian PAYG (where benets are
roughly proportional to earnings with little demand for private alternatives),
(ii) Beveridgean PAYG (where pensions benets are means-tested), (iii) DB
schemes (run in the workplace) and (iv) DC schemes (run partly through the
work place and via private initiative). Our analysis casts light on the relative
merits of each from a governance perspective.
Experience has taught us that both Bismarckian and private DB schemes
su¤er from serious credibility problems rooted in public and private gov-
ernance problems (political in the rst case, and corporate in the second).
These problems of credibility suggest shifting to a mix of means-tested state
pensions and individual DC schemes. The rst component would guarantee a
minimum income to all pensioners and is credible in any democratic society,
while the second will help people smooth consumption over their life-cycle.
It is interesting to note that U.K. policy has been edging in the direction
that we suggest. But there would be huge benets from making clear that
10This is the thrust of a recent set of six core principles put forward in OECD (2004).
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this is part of a longer term strategy and that the institutional foundations
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